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Abstract
Coordination Technologies (CT) that support
various aspects of organizational working
are now available in commercial markets.
Still, research on their organizational use has
shown their success is mixed. I employ Argyris’ organizational learning theory to find
out why organizations have been less successful in exploiting CT to support organizational effectiveness than their designers had
hoped. Specifically, I identify two areas
where explanations as well as potential solutions can be found: (1) people in organizations do not behave in the way the designers
expect and (2) the designers of CT do not behave in the way they think they do. Drawing
upon theory-based argumentation and a review of the literature, I argue that the benefits
of CT will not be fully realized until organizations can deploy CT not only for routine communication and coordination but also for fostering on-going reflection of their working
and learning practices, and for negotiating

control over the rules and resources employed in these practices. Next, I focus on
how organizations could design CT for use
beyond routine tasks. I propose using a combination of Issue-Based Information Systems
(IBIS) and Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) as a
CT platform to support organizational working and learning. I evaluate this platform in
light of the theory. But organizational change
toward continuous learning and the use of CT
to support working and learning are co-dependent and co-evolutionary. Consequently, I
recognize two intertwined conditions needed
to use CT successfully: (1) an organization’s
ability and willingness to become aware of
cognitive and structural anomalies before
and during the implementation of CT, and (2)
the aptitude of CT in fostering and reinforcing this awareness. Finally, I use a case study
to illustrate these conditions.
Keywords: coordination technology, defensive fit, negotiated control, organizational
learning, reflection, and emory, productive
reasoning, issue-based information systems,
case-based reasoning.
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1. Introduction
Rapid environmental and technological
changes require flexible and effective
team-based organizations. To meet the
challenges of change, teams are now increasingly responsible for both thinking
and doing, i.e. work as a whole. This
places new demands on the competence
of workers while at the same time making jobs more interesting and rewarding.
For information systems to be useful in
this context, their designers must acknowledge these conditions. Cleveland
(1985, p. 18) points out: “Not ‘command
and control’ but ‘conferring and networking’ become the mandatory modes
for getting things done. … ‘Planning’
cannot be done by a few leaders. …
Real-life planning is the dynamic improvisation by the many on a general
sense of direction. … More participatory
decision making implies a need for much
information, widely spread, and much
feedback, seriously attended, as in biological processes. … That means more
openness, not as ideological preference
but as a technological imperative.”
A myriad of computerized systems
such as computer conferencing systems,
multi-user editors, workflow systems,
and group decision support systems have
been designed to support various aspects
of individual, group, and organizational
working (Bannon 1993, Ellis et al.
1991). These systems are increasingly
available in commercial markets. In this
paper, I call these systems Coordination
Technologies1 (CT). Their designers2
have acknowledged participation, openness and many other requirements posed
by team-based organizations. Yet research on their organizational use has
shown mixed results (Grantham & Car-

asik 1988, Grudin 1988, Kling 1991,
Markus 1994, Orlikowski 1992b, Orlikowski & Gash 1994, Perin 1991). I use
organizational effectiveness as the measure of success. Effectiveness is a function, at the very least, of both reliable, efficient work routines and the ability to
question these routines, to experiment
with new ones to create flexible interpretations of computer-supported work, and
to enact these interpretations to invent
organizational environment (Daft &
Weick 1984).
I employ Argyris’ (1990) organizational learning theory to uncover why organizations have been less successful in
exploiting CT to increase organizational
effectiveness than the designers of CT
had hoped. This theory argues that the
traditional means of organizational change such as reorganizing work are necessary but not sufficient. To excel in the future, organizations must also learn to reflect upon and possibly change their behaviour in order to overcome defensive
routines; they must learn how to learn.
This theory has been used to interpret existing approaches to information systems
design and implementation (Levine &
Rossmoore 1994, Salaway 1987). I argue
in this paper that the theory may also
provide a fruitful direction of organizational and technological change that
would improve the likelihood CT can be
successfully deployed.
Organizational change toward learning orientation and the use of CT to support working and learning are co-dependent and co-evolutionary (DeSanctis
et al. 1993, DeSanctis & Poole 1994,
Lyytinen & Ngwenyama 1991, Markus
& Robey 1988, Orlikowski 1992a, Orlikowski & Gash 1994). I regard the organizational learning theory as an emer-
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gent process theory (Markus & Robey
1988), according to which the maximum
benefits of CT are unlikely to be realized
unless the organization (1) learns how to
learn and (2) employs CT to reinforce organizational learning in addition to using
them to control and coordinate work
processes. For example, Ciborra & Lanzara state (1994, p. 64) : “... the effective
adoption of new systems can only occur
through processes of learning where organizations become competent in
smoothly turning anomalies and novelties into innovative patterns of behaviour.” The reasoning that underlies this
emergent perspective is simple. Senge
states (1990, p.7): “Over the long run,
superior (organizational) performance
depends on superior (organizational)
learning.” Similarly, superior long-term
performance of CT depends on an organization’s ability to employ CT to facilitate and accelerate organizational learning.
This paper proceeds as follows: I
briefly present the organizational learning theory in Section 2. In Section 3, I
employ this theory to identify two domains that explain and possibly solve the
limited use of CT in non-routine situations: (1) people in organizations do not
behave in the way designers expect them
to behave and (2) designers do not behave in the way they think they do. On
the basis of this theoretical backing, I argue that CT are unlikely to succeed until
organizations deploy them not only for
routine coordination but also for fostering on-going reflection of their working
and learning practices, and for negotiating control over the rules and resources
employed in these practices. In Section
4, I focus on how organizations could design CT that would be used more broad-

ly. I propose a CT platform to support organizational working and learning based
on a combination of Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS) (Section 4.1) and
Case-Based Reasoning (Section 4.2). In
Section 4.3, I evaluate this platform in
light of organizational learning theory. I
recognize that any technology can be
(mis)used to enforce old habits, values
and norms. Therefore, I identify two intertwined conditions needed if CT are to
succeed: (1) the organization’s ability
and willingness to recognize cognitive
and structural anomalies before and during the implementation of CT, and (2)
CT’s ability to reinforce the development and sustenance of this awareness.
Number one (1) helps determine to what
extent it is possible to accomplish (2);
number two (2) enables (1). I conclude
section 4 by using a case example to
elaborate on the nature of these anomalies and inefficiencies and to depict how
the IBIS component of the CT platform
could be used to reinforce learning processes necessary to overcome these anomalies and inefficiencies. I present conclusions and suggestions for further research in Section 5.

2. Theoretical Background
Current emphasis on supporting organizational working and learning with CT
draws significantly on a theory of management called the involvement and
commitment theory (Argyris 1990, pp.
125-133). The theory advises against
submissiveness and unilateral control
and for self-management, involvement,
and commitment. It has proved powerful
in helping organizations redesign their
work and incentive systems. Moreover,
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the advocates of Participatory Design
(PD) draw upon this theory. A primary
argument for PD is that through participation, users become more involved and
committed to improving their computersupported work. However, the theory has
one major limitation: it does not explain
how it can be implemented without triggering embarrassment and threat (Argyris 1990, p. 121). Indeed, the more empowerment, meaningful participation,
and other social innovations are encouraged, the more potential exists for embarrassment and threat. For instance,
when work groups deploy a CT to take
on broader responsibilities and to become more autonomous, line management may feel threatened and enforce its
unilateral control over the deployment of
the technology.
Argyris draws upon extensive empirical and theoretical work to show that
implementation problems stem from
what he calls “programs” in the human
mind. These programs guide actors,3 especially in embarrassing or threatening
situations where they might lose control.
There are two types of programs (Argyris 1990, p. 13): (1) “the set of beliefs
and values people hold about how to
manage their lives” and (2) “the actual
rules they use to manage their beliefs.”
These programs are called, respectively,
espoused theories of action and theoriesin-use. Argyris emphasizes that human
action must be studied in terms of the
theory-in-use rather than espoused theory, which may not reflect actual behaviour.
Argyris makes a critical distinction
between two theories-in-use called Model I and Model II. Model I is dominant in
society. It provides the governing values
that guide actors to seek unilateral con-

trol, to win, and to suppress negative
feelings toward others. Moreover, it recommends action strategies that are selling, persuading, and that save face for
the actors. These governing values and
action strategies may seem normal and
acceptable because people are socialized
to take them for granted. Indeed, they are
applicable in handling routine situations
where actors simply reproduce existing
social practices (Giddens 1984). But
they also have negative implications for
organizational long-term effectiveness.
If all actors act according to these rules,
everyone may lose, and the organization
may be unable to uncover the (possibly
unjustified) beliefs underlying work routines. Model I reinforces existing practices by encouraging each actor to protect himself against other actors’ attempts to dominate. Argyris calls the
mode of reasoning that underlies actors’
protective behaviour ‘defensive reasoning.’ Defensive reasoning occurs when
actors (1) hold premises that may not be
valid but think they are, (2) make inferences that may not follow from the
premises but think they do, and (3) reach
conclusions that they think they have
tested carefully but they have not because they have framed the conclusions
in a way that prevents inquiry.
Any attempt to redraw the domains
of responsibility, autonomy, and control
in connection with the introduction and
deployment of CT is likely to threaten
some actors and activate defensive routines in the organization. These routines
distort or inhibit communication, deepen
mistrust, and cover up the real problems.
As a result, organizations keep solving
easy problems caused by other deeper
problems only to have the problems resurfaced later in another form. While sin-
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gle actors may be able to work productively, interdependence, and consequently the working and learning of the organization as a whole, suffers.
Argyris suggests a new theory-in-use
called Model II to help actors change
their behaviour so that the benefits promised by the involvement and commitment theory can be fully realized even in
embarrassing or threatening situations.
Model II recognizes that actors, even if
committed to change, cannot do so unless they learn how their behaviour and
underlying values can lead to mediocre
performance. Once they understand this,
they must learn to act differently so that
Model II moves from an espoused theory
to the theory-in-use. The idea is simple:
people must become proficient in acting
and simultaneously reflecting on this action to learn from it. This so called double-loop learning implies the need to uncover and criticize the governing values
and assumptions, construct different interpretations based on new governing
values, and experiment with new ways of
working in order to enact a new reality
instead of merely solving problems in
the present environment.
The governing values of Model II are
choice based on valid information, and
responsibility to monitor the implementation of the choice. These values require
actors to use two action strategies: (1)
advocate their positions and encourage
inquiry into or confirmation of them, and
(2) minimize unilateral face saving. The
first strategy implies a new mode of reasoning, i.e. productive reasoning, in
which people clarify their premises and
inferences to themselves and others. Actors are open to constructive confrontation and evaluations. As a result, discursive social action (Habermas 1984) be-

comes the dominant type of interaction
among actors in non-routine situations.
Face saving occurs when people censor information because they fear they
will upset their colleagues if they are
candid. Actors do not test whether this is
truely the case. Rather, they cover up that
they are hiding information and even
cover up their cover-up. Thus it makes
sense to minimize face saving.
Combined, these strategies improve
the validity of information in several
ways: Actors are encouraged to reflect
thoroughly on their premises and assumptions so that they can be clear about
their positions and the reasons for advocating the positions. They are also encouraged to discuss previously taboo issues because there is little fear that someone will manipulate such candor to win
others over. Additionally, actors do not
waste time defending themselves and
distorting their true feelings and intentions.
In summary, the theory’s power is
that it concentrates on increasing organizations’ ability to resolve deep problems,
the problems causing or magnifying
more easily visible problems.

3. Implications for Research and
Design of Coordination Technologies
Most designers and researchers of Coordination Technologies espouse Model II
because seeking to support organizational working and learning would make little sense under the authoritarian world of
Model I. Yet many examples in the literature report how CT have been designed
and deployed to reinforce unilateral control of certain groups (e.g., management)
over other groups (e.g., workers). For ex-
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ample, Orlikowski (1991) and Zuboff
(1988) illustrate with many case examples how managers deployed CT to make
organizational processes visible in a new
way, and thereby enable ideational control. Workers behaved according to the
rules and norms embedded in the technology because they realized their superiors or peers could see what they were
doing.
In light of Argyris’ theory, the use of
CT to establish unilateral control is understandable in non-routine situations.
Anderson (1991, p. 121) cites Krantz &
Gilmore (1990) to clarify the point: “...
bureaucracies, and their attendant structures and policies, function as social and
psychological defenses. Positions and
roles are institutionalized to avoid the
anxiety and unpleasant situations that
might arise in less structured organizations. To the extent that organizations
and their component work groups function as defenses, it is likely that any computer systems developed and deployed
will incorporate and further these defensive functions.” I call this fit between defensive organizations and defensive
technologies defensive fit.
A central paradigm underlying CT is
that people use CT to share their work
and knowledge and to accomplish more
than any one person could achieve alone.
In light of this paradigm, unilateral control of some influential group(s) over the
resources and rules afforded by CT is often inappropriate. A move toward mutual control of all the involved groups is
needed. However, the Model II theoryin-use does not imply full mutual control
over the rules and resources (including
CT) deployed. If this were implied, fully
egalitarian organizations would be called
for. But learning how to learn and inter-

nalizing Model II congruent governing
values do presuppose that groups can negotiatiate control over the rules and resources openly and constructively. This
is because decisions over autonomy, privacy, and control of work and the supporting technologies largely determine
who has the right and responsibility to
know, do, and learn in the organization.
In a learning organization, these decisions can seldom be made unilaterally.
As a result of negotiations and on-going reflection of work and managerial
practices, groups develop mutual understanding about their resource and control
requirements so that they can effectively
and efficiently share knowledge and perform, coordinate, control and transform
their work processes. Each individual or
group has primary control through the
technology over the material and knowledge created by that individual or group,
but this control can be shared or transferred as a result of constructive negotiations (or the contracts resulting from
such negotiations) whenever necessary. I
call this control scheme negotiated control.
The discrepancy between the paradigm underlying CT and the Model Idriven organizations is a critical factor in
explaining why CT have not been fully
exploited to foster organizational learning. Another critical factor is the defensive fit. In the following sections, I
strengthen my argument that these factors bear the blame by focusing on two
problematic domains: (1) designers espouse Model II but organizational actions are guided by Model I, and (2) designers espouse Model II but their theory-in-use is Model I. These domains are
concerned with individual, organizational, and technological issues because the
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explanations can be found from their interaction (Orlikowski 1992a).
3.1. Designers espouse Model II but
the organizational theory-in-use is
Model I
Researchers have paid much attention to
helping organizations design and use CT
to support effective enactment of work
routines. Theoretical approaches such as
speech-act theory (Flores et al. 1988),
transaction cost theory (Ciborra 1987),
and coordination theory (Malone &
Crowston 1990) have been suggested to
explain how activities are coordinated
and how CT should be designed. However, none of these approaches has taken
into account the perspective of organizational learning and the need for negotiated control over technologies and knowledge resources. Many existing development methodologies, for example, the
sociotechnical ETHICS method (Mumford 1983) and Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland & Scholes 1990), do address the need for ongoing interpretation,
learning, and negotiation between various stakeholders involved in design. But
they do not tell how to enact such social
processes without triggering organizational defenses (Hägerfors 1994).
The earlier research does take into
account the discrepancy between systems based on the involvement and commitment theory and organizational values and norms based on Model I. In particular, structural aspects of organizations and technologies have been widely
researched. For example, DeSanctis et
al. (1993, 1994) present adaptive structuration theory stating that the structural
properties of the technology must match
the social, economic, and political structures for the technology to succeed. It is

more likely, according to the theory, that
the CT encouraging participation will
succeed if an organization has instituted
a total quality management (TQM) program specifically calling for participative decision making. Similarly, Orlikowski (1992b) argues that when the
premises underlying CT are incompatible with an organization’s culture, policies, and reward systems, effective, cooperative computing is unlikely unless
these structural properties change. For
example, Orlikowski and Gash (1994)
focus on the use of a commercially available CT called Lotus Notes™ in a consulting company. They found that almost
all the consultants hesitated to put anything more sensitive than routine information on the CT. Their hesitation was
primarily the result of a mismatch between the designers’ assumptions of
openness and trust embedded in the CT
and the consultants’ use of unilateral
control of information to reduce the possibilities of embarrassment and threat.
Designers perceived the climate of the
organization as open and trusting; consequently, they left up to users the security
and privacy issues related to Notes databases. Their assumptions were unjustified. In fact, the consultants worked in a
competitive and uncertain career environment. They feared betraying client
confidentiality or subjecting their information to misinterpretation or criticism,
if they used Notes to share information
without unilateral control over their information resources in Notes databases.
A good description of a mismatch between Model II technologies and Model
I organizations is given by Perin (1991),
who calls CT ‘electronic social fields.’
She says (p. 76): “On the one hand, electronic social fields subvert managers’ as-

T. Käkölä 51

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 1995

7

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 7 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 4

sumptions about conventional bureaucratic organizations because they call
into question organizational authority,
they cross functional divisions, and they
create options for the times and places of
work. On the other hand, ... such autonomy, cross-functional cooperation, and alternatives meet many of the criteria said
to be conducive to innovation and productivity in bureaucracies.” She goes on
to examine the impact of this mismatch
on the adoption of CT: “Managers who
see social fields as being antistructural,
will be disappointed in groupware investments and unlikely to sustain them
over the long run.”
One alternative to avoiding the “antistructural” technology might be that
management would enforce unilateral
control over its use. However, this defensive action would likely trigger workers
to activate their own defensive routines,
possibly giving up on the technology altogether. Swanson (1993) calls for computer-mediated communication policies
on the use and information content of CT
and the consequences of violating the
policies. These policies are intended to
guide actors toward using CT in a way
that is valuable to the organization as a
whole. But Swanson does not acknowledge that such policies are difficult to
write in ways that clarify what is sanctioned and what is not. As a result, actors
may stop using CT whenever a chance of
punishment exists, and cover up that they
are doing so.
The odds are against CT as long as
superiors see them as threatening their
status and subordinates see them as a
means of management control. The best
hope is the gradual move toward Model
II. Proper incentive structures must also
be devised to help actors see CT as a

means to reinforce double-loop learning.
The use of incentives could dramatically
reduce resistance to using CT.
Two types of incentive structures will
work: one based on the effectiveness of
team work (Kanter 1989), and the other
based on the use of technology (Orlikowski 1992b). Kanter (1989) argues
that cooperation and synergy between
people and between organizational units
remain buzzwords without real effect
and meaning if incentives based on the
effectiveness of team work are not in
place. She implies that Coordination
Technologies have scant meaning without incentives to foster team work. At
best, they are used as individual productivity tools, since people get paid for personal excellence.
Orlikowski (1992b) states that actors
in hierarchical positions below senior
management cannot “afford” to use the
technology without reward systems (incentives and proper evaluation criteria)
based on its use. Clearly, changing incentive structures is easier when CT are
not seen as antistructural but as means to
reinforce organizational learning. When
CT are in interorganizational use, clients’ demands for improved service
through improved coordination may also
work as incentives.
3.2. Designers espouse Model II but
their theory-in-use is Model I
I have emphasized the incongruity between Model I-related organizational
factors and the involvement and commitment theory-based systems to explain
the lackluster success of CT. This explanation does not imply that the design approaches of CT have no role. On the contrary, designers and researchers must focus on assessing and understanding the
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true opportunities and limitations of new
technologies at work. This is a challenging task for two reasons. First, the literature in the field is flooded with technological utopianism amplifying the possibility of valued social change and underplaying the possibility of significant
social problems (Kling 1991). Second,
the functionality of CT (possibly meant
to foster actors’ involvement and commitment) can actually trigger organizational defenses, a possibility that may not
be obvious to the designers. I will focus
on design issues next.
Coordination Technologies impose
various social structures as rules for interaction depending on their functions
and specific features (DeSanctis & Poole
1994, Lyytinen & Ngwenyama 1991).
For example, they may emphasize efficient work processes and the task at hand
and discourage socialization during
work. Many structures are incompatible
with Model II. First, many CT provide
limited support for the on-going reflection that is necessary to create new
knowledge and practices out of prevailing routines. Second, the concept of negotiated control is inadequately reflected
in the structures of existing CT. This incompatibility may stem from designers’
espousal of Model II but use of Model I.
Salaway (1987) studied the nature of designer-user interactions and found theories-in-use of both designers and users
were congruent with Model I.
This defensive fit between Model I
congruent structural properties of technologies and organizations seems as appropriate a predictor for unimpressive
organizational exploitation of technologies as the mismatch between Model II
congruent properties of technologies and
Model I-driven organizations. To elabo-

rate my contention, I will discuss some
typical features of electronic mail, workflow management, and group support
systems, and examine how their designers’ possibly unconscious Model I-driven thinking may have affected the structural properties of technology and thereby mediated unanticipated patterns in the
organizational use of technology. I conclude by stating two design goals of CT.
Email systems have become widely
used tools for routine communication
and coordination, and as such are clearly
successful. One of their main benefits is
flexibility: they impose few rules for social interaction, making them especially
suited to handle ad-hoc situations and to
foster organizational learning through
socialization. However, their control
scheme is unilateral: actors can (in a
technical sense) quickly and inexpensively process in any fashion the email
received (e.g., forward a confidential
message from actor X to actor Y without
X knowing it), but cannot control what
happens to the email they send. The lack
of negotiated control in the design makes
it difficult for actors to discuss issues
they perceive as threatening or embarrassing. Instead, this design flaw may
hasten the formation of defenses because
all the parties involved eventually notice
the (mis)use of email for unilateral control, but this very cognizance is itself
never discussed due to the defensive routines (Markus 1994, Zuboff 1988). For
example, Markus (1994) found in a case
study that confidential messages were
forwarded, and the actors in the organization were aware of it. Yet, most actors
were reluctant to devise a solution that
would have required forwarders to request permission from message senders.
Markus hypothesized this solution was
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perceived as too time-consuming for
routine situations. Instead, most email
users tried to word their confidential or
sensitive messages obscurely so that
they could be interpreted on several levels, at least one harmless. They also disguised their cover-up behaviour. Argyris
(1990) calls such behaviour skilled incompetence.
Workflow management technologies
have gradually improved beyond simply
speeding up routines to supporting organizational working and learning (1) by
making explicit which actors and work
groups are responsible for which activities, documents and materials (Käkölä
1995), (2) by monitoring and measuring
the enactment of work processes using
various qualitative and quantitative attributes, and providing the resultant information to the responsible actors, and
(3) by allowing the dynamic redesign of
these processes as they are being enacted
(Abbott & Sarin 1994, Rein et al. 1993).
Unfortunately, while these CT provide
extensive support for the creation and
management of organizational role prescriptions and for the assignment of various system resources to actors enacting
the roles, they provide little support for
reflection and negotiation about how,
when, and by whom the roles and the
role-connected rules and resources are
defined and controlled. This, in turn,
may foster an institutionalized, congealed use of CT and lead CT to tighten
the normative regulation of work. Of
course, the designers and researchers of
workflow management technologies
have gradually begun to acknowledge
the need of computer support for meetings and conferences in which performance is reviewed and plans are created to
redesign organizational processes to

make better use of workflow management technologies, see for instance (Abbott & Sarin 1994, p. 117). Yet, they do
not recognize the possible need to uncover and question the premises and values on which these plans and decisions
are based. Consequently, their conception of meetings and negotiations is limited as far as organizational double-loop
learning is concerned.
Nor have the designers of systems
specifically designed to support meetings and other equivocal work domains
fully grasped the complexities of organizational behaviour. For example, anonymous idea generation and evaluation are
standard features of group support systems. Anonymity allows mutual control
within a group over sensitive and controversial issues and ideas, while ensuring
that only the ideas are criticized, not their
proponents. Additionally, anonymity is
said to foster open and honest discussion
and to help actors confront conflicts (DeSanctis et al. 1993, p. 13). Most people
probably agree with such goals. But why
is anonymity needed in the first place, if
openness, honesty, and participation are
so highly appreciated? This fundamental
question has received scant attention in
coordination technology research. Furthermore, the researchers who have addressed issues related to anonymity, see
for instance (Connolly et al. 1993, Jessup et al. 1990), have primarily concentrated on how CT can be used to remove
or reduce the effects of social dilemmas
(e.g., status influence) without dealing
with the causes of these dilemmas (e.g.,
status differences among team members).
Anonymity is nothing but a bypass
strategy. It fails to address the underlying
reasons why actors avoid openness, hon-
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esty, and participation when held personally accountable for what they say and
do. To put it more precisely, the technology bypasses the reasons. Even if a team
produces good ideas through anonymous
idea generation, many of these ideas may
never be implemented. This is because
organizational defenses are not reduced.
Indeed, defenses may be made stronger
by ideas that are threatening to some
groups.
Technologies endorsing the concepts
of Model I cannot be effectively deployed to reinforce Model II behaviour,
unless users are knowledgeable, motivated, and powerful enough to substantially reinterpret them. In the long term,
these technologies are unlikely to help
organizations solve the tough problems
requiring double-loop learning. However, this fact is difficult to realize in the
short term since people can use the technology to speed up their work. Unfortunately, they continue to solve wrong
problems and may disguise that they are
doing so.
In fact, these technologies may hamper progress toward Model II by making
people believe that some magical features of computerized systems permit
discussions about topics that were previously taboo. Once people realize that little will change as long as real problems
are ignored, they are likely to defend
themselves vigorously again. The outcome of a well-intended technological
intervention may end up making the buried problems worse.
To overcome this defensive fit, designers must start surfacing their own
Model I-related values and beliefs that
govern both their design decisions and
expectations about the usefulness of CT.
Perin says (1991, p. 81): “The challenge

is to create computer support that acknowledges, if not incorporates, these
realities (social and cultural dynamics),
rather than presume that the technology
will by itself reform or obliterate them.”
However, she presents no strategies to
meet the challenge.
Organizational learning theory takes
a step in the right direction by indicating
that organizations can change their behaviour toward Model II and establish
organizational norms and values that reinforce the new learning orientation. CT
must become part of this new culture if
they are to be fully exploited in Model II
organizations. Two interrelated design
goals are needed: CT should function to
(1) reinforce the effects of organizational
learning and (2) facilitate the learning
process itself. In light of the concept of
negotiated control, fulfilling these goals
presupposes that, as already discussed in
the panel on privacy issues in CSCW ’92
(Clement 1993), CT should support not
only the completion of tasks but also reflection and negotiation over control of
the tasks and the resources used in these
tasks. These goals are realistic because
they recognize that no CT can make an
organization adopt Model II. In the following, I illustrate the realization of
these goals in the context of one CT.

4. Supporting Organizational
Learning with Issue-Based
Information Systems and Case-Based
Reasoning
Many organizations are trapped in a
doom loop: as long as coordination and
control of work is in disorder, resolving
the underlying largely Model I-related
reasons for the disorder is difficult. Part-
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ly as a result of organizations’ inability
to look inward and resolve significant
problems, much time is spent trying to
produce order through easy but superficial solutions (Argyris 1990, Senge
1990). Nothing is inherently bad in chaos
and disorder. Quite the contrary, they can
foster innovation and the creation of new
knowledge (Nonaka 1991). However, organizations need to learn to manage disorder and chaos productively and constructively instead of resorting to the use
of power and unilateral control to establish order. Thus, achieving and reinforcing a shift from Model I toward Model II
theory-in-use can be a fundamental and
complex organizational challenge. The
shift may take years and its impacts pervade the organization.
In my view, this challenge has significant implications on the design and use
of CT for organizational learning. To reinforce a move in the direction of Model
II, these systems should not only foster
the production and reproduction of social order but also help organizations
deal with the ambiguity and threat inherent in social change. Kling supports this
argument when he states (Kling 1991, p.
86): “We cannot advance our understanding of CSCW with discussions such
as The Coordinator,4 which focus on specific kinds of conversations about tasks
in organizations, and ignore conversations about the processes of organizing,
which might restructure patterns of authority, obligation, and cooperation.”
Ciborra & Lanzara (1994, pp. 82-83)
go one step further than Kling by arguing
for two specific qualities for CT. First,
“systems should be ‘expert,’ though
quite a different way from current conceptions: In addition to supporting or replacing knowledge-based established

routines of professionals and managers
…, they should support their capabilities
for reflection and inquiry within the contexts in which they are embedded, helping them to build up, question, and modify practical knowledge according to the
emergence and the shift of problematic
situations and contexts.” Second, “systems should be designed as proactive,
dynamic mirrors of human action, supporting and enhancing perpetual individual and institutional self-questioning: in
short, they should play the role of ‘reflectors,’ helping the users connect their
practical and argumentative routines to
the established or emerging formative
contexts, rather than concealing that connection, as they often do.” Unfortunately, Ciborra and Lanzara (1994) do not
elaborate on how to build ‘expert reflectors’ or what they would look like.
In this section, I envision a CT platform that could complement systems
such as the Coordinator to facilitate the
reflexive monitoring and self-questioning of existing actions and routines, and
to ease the consequent shift toward Model II. As Model II calls for discursive social action (Habermas 1994), this process is best supported by the use of discourse and argumentation-oriented technology. Organizational learning also
requires some type of organizational
memory (Huber 1991, Walsh & Ungson
1991). First, in order “to demonstrate or
use learning, that which has been learned
must be stored in memory and then
brought from memory” (Huber 1991, p.
106). Second, organizational memory allows an organization to learn more (Huber 1991). Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS) and Case-Based Reasoning
(CBR) are two methods that can meet
these requirements.5 In the following, I
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propose that IBIS and CBR could be
used to build a CT platform that would
support both single-loop and doubleloop learning.
This section is not intended to convince the reader that a new technology
alone would solve the cognitive and
structural challenges that organizations
confront as they deploy CT. Instead, I
make two points. First, instead of bypassing the effects of Model I behaviour,
and thereby reinforcing the defensive fit,
CT should be (designed so that they can
be) used as interactive mirrors to make
actors aware of their skilled incompetence and to enable them to reflect critically on their behaviour. DeSanctis et al.
(1993, p. 26), though not addressing
skilled incompetence, partially support
this claim by stating that when a CT
“helps the group organize its work and,
perhaps more important, learn to reflect
on and control its (work) processes, the
group should be more effective.” Even if
behavioural change is not possible, increased awareness alone may help build
trust, thus improving organizational
long-term effectiveness. Second, while it
is necessary and fruitful to criticize previous research and existing or envisioned technologies, and to present abstract statements and prescriptions on
CT design, it is not sufficient. Criticisms
and prescriptions should be crystallized
into a form solid enough to allow further
development, testing, and criticism in order to foster the accumulation of knowledge in the CT research domain. The CT
platform envisioned below is one such
crystallization.

4.1. Facilitating structured discourse
with IBIS
Learning and self-questioning processes
require actors to communicate. Argumentation theory (Toulmin 1958) and especially the Issue-Based Information
Systems method (Rittel 1972) help to
structure discourse, thereby clarifying
the nature of problems under discussion.
The method provides three conceptual
entities for structuring discourse: Issues,
Positions and Arguments. The entities
are related to each other by labelled
links; each label describes the type of relationship. For example, an Argument either Supports or Objects-to Positions.
Another entity called Reference represents facts that support or object to the
other entities. The resulting network
structure is called an issue-net.
Issues represent controversial decisions to be made and problems to be resolved through a discussion. Positions
stand for possible resolutions. These positions are often contradictory and none
is necessarily the right solution. Each position is supported or refuted by arguments. The underlying rationale is that
actors choose the solution that seems
most plausible in light of the arguments.
Validation of the cogency of the arguments can be carried out by subjecting
them to a process of repeated attacks and
defenses (Hashim 1993). The entities
and the relationships of the IBIS method
are represented in Figure 1.
The primary advantage to deploying
IBIS is the improved quality of the discourse processes. The quality can be defined with three components: discourse
coherency, completeness and ambiguity
(Auramäki et al. 1988, Brown & Yule
1983). Coherency refers to how logically
the discourse proceeds through various
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FIGURE 1. The entities and the relationships between them in the IBIS-method (Hashim
1991, p. 286).
Replaces, Questions or
Generalizes or
Is-suggested-by
Specializes

Reference

Questions or
Is-suggested-by

Responds-to

Questions or
Is-suggested-by

Issue

Objects-to
Position
Generalizes or
Specializes

Supports

stages. A complete discourse is coherent
and fulfils the conditions needed to terminate it (i.e., the issue has been resolved through argumentation). Ambiguity refers both to the ambiguity of the
roles of the actors involved in the discourse and to the clarity of the issues discussed. In Section 4.4, I illustrate the use
of IBIS to help organizations learn to
manage ambiguity productively. Naturally, these three components are intertwined. For example, it is difficult to establish conditions for completeness in
embarrassing, highly ambiguous situations.
IBIS improves coherency by emphasizing the creation of new issues as possible sources of new knowledge and investigating these issues through argumentation while reducing the likelihood
that the discourse processes devolve into
insignificant issues. According to Chang

Argument
Supports,
Objects-to,
Generalizes or
Specializes

et al. (1993, p. 63) “it supports constructive discourse by focusing on the central
issue, encouraging relevant questions
and answers, and being specific about
the supporting or objecting evidence on
any position.” IBIS also helps assess the
completeness of discourse. For example,
discourse is usually incomplete when issues lack positions or positions lack arguments (Hashim 1991). Moreover, the
IBIS structuring is natural, intuitively
appealing, and consequently easy to understand. It allows for informal dialogue,
and thus does not require actors to alter
their ordinary forms of discourse (Chang
et al. 1993). The method has been tested
and used to assist civic and policy planning (Rittel 1972), auditing (Chang et al.
1993), collaborative learning (Rathnam
et al. 1992), software design (Conklin &
Begeman 1988), and scientific collaboration (Hashim 1991, Hämäläinen et al.
1992).
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The features of IBIS are well suited
to the action strategies of Model II. By
constructing personal issue-nets, actors
are able to make their positions and arguments clear and recognize possible gaps
and inconsistencies. Actors can also
make their conclusions publicly testable
by sharing their issue-nets and can learn
productive reasoning and conflict resolution through argumentation. As a result,
it is easier for actors to reflect upon their
actions and the underlying premises and
values, and thus reach a shared understanding of problems.
The chief limitation of many implementations of IBIS is their inability to
augment individual work in the way
most decision support systems do. For
instance, other than retrieving old discussions, no memory aids are provided.
Thus, enhancing the systems with a
method such as case-based reasoning
would provide an interactive working
and learning environment.
4.2. Case-Based Reasoning as an
organizational memory
In some cases, learning before doing is
more effective than learning by doing.
This type of learning requires that redundant knowledge, i.e. potentially relevant
knowledge for which actors may have no
immediate or planned use, be developed
and shared with all actors for eventual
application in new, rapidly evolving situations (Nonaka 1991). One way to
achieve this is to rotate people through
different jobs and experiences. A supplementary method is to build and maintain
computer-based organizational memories or experience bases to facilitate
learning. Case-Based Reasoning is a way
to build and use such an experience base.

CBR uses reasoning from past experience to interpret and explain anomalous situations and to propose and critique solutions (Kolodner 1991). It is a
powerful method of reasoning because it
is consistent with people’s natural behaviour and applied daily by all of us. As
opposed to artificial intelligence research, CBR emphasizes augmenting
rather than automating human work.
Walsh & Ungson (1991, p. 62) state
that “interpretations about organizational
decisions and their subsequent consequences constitute an organization’s
memory.” In CBR, these interpretations
are represented as cases, each describing
the state of the world before action; the
problem (issue) to be solved; the solution
(position) to the problem, and the consequences. Additionally, causal connections among the initial situation, the solution, and the consequences should always be included in a case (if these connections can be identified) so that the
reasons for the outcome can be recalled
later. This method facilitates learning before doing.
CBR supports two modes of behaviour: problem-solving and interpretive.
In the problem solving mode, cases offer
old solutions as a guide for solving new
problems, and old mistakes and failures
as a way to prevent actors from repeating
them. Past solutions are adapted to new
situations. In the interpretive mode, cases are used to evaluate new situations
and validate or invalidate possible solutions. Sometimes, solutions are fixed beforehand and cases are needed to justify
them. Evaluation is carried out through
argumentation as explained in Section
4.1. The cases are employed to generate
supporting and refuting arguments and to
serve as references for the arguments. Of
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course, these two modes are intertwined.
For example, a solution proposed by one
case during the problem solving mode
may be found unworkable in the interpretation mode. Actors must then either
readapt the solution or search for others
by retrieving new cases.
Cases can stimulate the creation of
knowledge and organizational learning
in many ways. For example, organizations can resolve present contradictions
(such as developing a high quality product that is cheap to make) by studying
analogous situations from the past that
applied to totally different products,
processes, and even industries (Nonaka
1991). CBR is well suited to provide
such analogies (Kolodner 1991). It has
been applied to planning (Hammond
1989), medical diagnosis (Turner 1989),
and legal reasoning (Ashley 1988).
4.3. Combining IBIS and CBR to
facilitate organizational learning
Combined, IBIS and CBR create a CT
platform with a strong theoretical base.
CBR assists individual and organizational learning and interpretation processes
in a way that social psychologists have
proven natural and consistent with cognitive aspects of human behaviour (Read
& Cesa 1990). IBIS allows actors to
share experiences and interpretations in
a dialectical manner that encourages inquiry into actors’ beliefs and premises
(Churchman 1971) and supports constructive negotiation to resolve conflicts
(Chang 1993).
Nevertheless, in light of Argyris’ theory it is unlikely that this CT platform
could be fully exploited in defensive organizations. The content of the experience bases reflects interpretation processes based on single-loop learning.

Therefore CBR produces, at best, partial
solutions to complex organizational
problems requiring double-loop learning. For example, Kanter (1983) has
found that when organizational conflicts
are resolved by consensus, winners conveniently “forget” losers’ critique to save
losers’ face. Losers also are willing to
forget for the sake of the common good.
This implies that little incentive exists
for either party to memorize the process
of change and its underlying reasoning.
However, because these issues often cannot be discussed, the possibly detrimental implications of forgetting on building
up organizational memory remain unresolved. The same weakness applies to
IBIS. If nothing else changes, issues that
cannot be discussed before the introduction of CT remain taboo after its introduction. For example, Arendt (1958, p.
82) states: “Authority ... is incompatible
with persuasion, which presupposes
equality and works through a process of
argumentation. Where arguments are
used, authority is left in abeyance.” Consequently, faced with threatening and
embarrassing situations, actors in defensive organizations usually stick to their
positions regardless of the supporting
and objecting arguments. They also want
unilateral control over the pieces of
knowledge (such as the cases in the casebased part of organizational memory)
and other resources that could be drawn
upon during the argumentation process.
As a result, discussions progress slowly
or are terminated by the most powerful
actors. Many designers neglect this fact
altogether or implement features that bypass the behavioural problems (e.g. Section 3.2).
Organizations face two alternatives
in appropriating this platform: either to
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use CT only in domains where the likelihood of embarrassment and threat is
minimal, or to deploy them additionally
to foster and reinforce organizational
learning, in cases where the prevailing
division of work and the standard operating procedures are inadequate and a fundamental organizational redesign is essential. Clearly, the first alternative is viable and technologies are used effectively, for example in technical design
applications, where rational interpretation process is preferable. However, for
organizations that want to reap the benefits of the involvement and commitment
theory, the second alternative is the obvious choice. This alternative also accords
with the two design goals presented in
Section 3.2.
While the theoretical base of the CT
platform cannot explicitly address all the
virtues of Model II, the following analysis suggests that the platform could be
applied to support and reinforce learning. As noted above, CBR reinforces
Model I behaviour because the experience bases reflect interpretations based
on Model I. This process must be interrupted by reinterpreting the cases in light
of Model II. Facilitators are usually
needed to set the process in motion. One
purpose of the process, however, is to
train actors to interpret cases themselves
without outside help. This is the only
way to ensure that actions as well as the
cases describing the actions will reflect
and reinforce Model II.
Argyris (1990) argues that the best
way of learning how to learn is through
solving actual business problems in
training seminars that specifically address organizational learning dilemmas.
In his method, each actor envisions in
writing how he or she would communi-

cate with other actors to solve a problem.
A group discusses the cases to make individual actors aware of the discrepancy
between intentions and actions and how
this discrepancy contributes to mediocre
performance. Finally, the actors learn to
redesign their conversations so that issues that were previously off-limits become discussible. An IBIS-based system
could be very useful in this process. Each
actor could write the case as an issue-net
in which she or he would explicitly distinguish between the envisioned conversation and information that the actor
would not communicate for whatever
reason. The group could then analyze
these issue-nets to find out how the conversation, its results, and the reasoning
underlying the results would change if
the undiscussibles were discussed. The
computer-supported argumentative case
method is likely to be a good basis for
extending existing CT because several
researchers (among them Argyris
(1990), Rossmoore (1994), and Senge
(1990)) have found the case method useful for learning how to learn. In the following, I elaborate on how the IBIS
component of the CT platform could be
used to support and reinforce Model II
learning processes.
4.4. Learning productive reasoning
and negotiated control with IBIS
I sketch in this section (a) how Model Irelated defensive routines and the defensive reasoning on which these routines
are based are evident in discussions
about threatening and embarrassing issues; (b) how these discussions must
shift to reflect productive reasoning, if
defensive routines are to be engaged, and
(c) how actors can deploy IBIS to reflect
upon their discourse and to learn to nego-
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FIGURE 2. Using the IBIS — structuring of a discourse to illustrate defensive reasoning in

the organizational design context. I=Issue, P=Position, A=Argument
I1: (Partner 1) Should senior
partners intervene in the
project management procResponds-to
Responds-to
P1: (Manager 1, Implicit) No.
P4: (Partners, Implicit)
Supports

A1: (Manager 1) If partners intervene, the management of
the firm will become distorted.
Questions
Is-suggest-

Supports

I2: (Consultant) Are partners
incompetent?

A2: (Manager 2) Partners’ actions can result in a short circuit of a coherent managerial

I3: (Consultant) Do the managers fear that they will be micro-managed by the part-

Responds-to

P2: (Managers) Partners are
wrong (in suggesting participating) but are not open to

Generalizes

P3: (Partners) You managers
fear losing control of the
project

A3: (Manager 2) The projects
usually end up worse.
Objects-to

Responds-to

Supports

A4: (Partners) We are not that
wrong nor that closed.
Specializes
A5: (Partner 2) We are worried that if we defer to the
management of the project,
we might lose the thing we
hold dear.
We feel like we need to be
able to control the process
long enough to assure that it

Specializes
A6: (Partner 1) I am open to
trying. Hopefully, I’ll get some
confidence that the managers
aren’t trying to … put me out
of my field.
And, they’ll get some confidence that I’m not trying to …
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FIGURE 3. Using the IBIS — structuring of the redesigned discourse to illustrate

productive reasoning. I=Issue, P=Position, A=Argument

Responds-

I1: (Partner 1) Should senior
partners intervene in the
project management proc-

P1: (Manager 1, Implicit)

Supports
A2: (Manager 1) Let me illusObjects-to
trate with examples some of
the fears that I have and get
A1: (Manager 1) I do not wish
your and others’ reactions.
to prevent Partner 1from talkI2: (Manager 1) What fears I
RespondsP2: (Manager 1) My doubt is
related to your commitment to
a managerial process. Because you are beginning, it is
likely that you may violate the
structure and the rules in
ways that are counterproducObjects-to

RespondsP4: (Partners, Implici

Is-suggestedIs-suggested-by

I3: (Manager 1) Are my fears
unfair in your mind?
Responds-

P5: (Partner 1) If I hear you
correctly, you are concerned
about how genuinely open I
will be about my ability to reduce my fears of the rug’s being pulled out from under me,

A4: (Manager 1) I realize the
dangers of using a structure
Is-suggested-by
Supports
and rules to project managI5: (Partner 1) Why not pick
A3: (Manager 1) I don’t know
some examples and let’s try
how to confront Partner 2 in
them out. I may find that I am
ways that we can learn from
not as open as I espouse; or
that I vacillate, etc. You may
Specializes
Suppoprts

A6: (Manager 1) I think I feel
free to tell you, but my automatic reaction is to tell you
how wrong you are and how

A5: (Manager 1) But I do not
know how to carry out my job
without the security of the
Specializes
A7: (Manager 1) I am willing
to try to design modes with
which all of us can agree.
Is-suggested-

I4: (Partner 1, implicit) How
Respondscan we reduce these fears
and develop a sense of trust?
P4: (Partner 1) Let us see if
P3: (Partner 1) Let’s take
with the consultant’s help and
some examples of your worst
our own, we can develop a
fears and role-play them to
greater sense of trust in our
see what I would say and how
Responds-
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tiate control of their work constructively.
To illustrate, I employ the IBIS method
to analyze and interpret Argyris’ (1990,
pp. 111-116) case example of a discussion about a threatening and embarrassing situation related to organizational design. The illustration is of special interest
to coordination technology research: a
thorough understanding of the complex
social processes inherent in situations
where the prevailing social order is disrupted and restructured is required before CT can be designed to foster on-going reflection, self-questioning, and negotiated control of work routines as effectively as they now support the
enactment of routines (Kling 1991).
4.4.1. The case example and its IBIS
interpretation
The case concerns the organizational design process of a small architectural and
real estate development company. The
company suffered from severe structural
problems: actors’ areas of responsibility
were unclear, tasks were poorly coordinated, and senior partners gave contradictory orders to the technical staff. Yet,
the company was successful because the
actors were highly committed to providing excellent customer service. The company had decided to expand its business
significantly, however, making a new organizational structure crucial. The senior
partners sought more order, stability and
clarity. A new organizational structure
should redefine job responsibilities and
the relationships between various
groups. A consultant was hired to help.
The consultant reasoned that most
actors were well aware of the existing
work roles and structure as well as the
chaos embedded in them. Yet, because of
the prevalent defensive routines, actors

had done nothing to change the structure
or to employ this chaos as a source of innovation. The consultant recommended
a two-step process in which the senior
partners would (1) jointly develop a new
organizational design while at the same
time reducing defenses, and (2) acquire
the skills and establish the sense of trust
that enables productive reasoning, and
helps actors continue to reduce old and
prevent new defenses. This recommendation was accepted and the design process was started. During design sessions,
the need for double-loop learning quickly became clear, and the actors realized
that the new design would likely fail if
the defensive routines were not eliminated.
I analyze a specific discussion during
which Partner 1, one of the two senior
partners, has suggested that the partners
should have the right to intervene in the
management of projects. His comment
has upset the two project managers. The
transcription of this discussion is given
in Appendix A. I use the IBIS method to
interpret and visualize causal structures
reflecting the actors’ theories-in-use
(Figure 2). The interpretation makes explicit the implications of defensive reasoning. The central issue is should the
senior partners intervene in the project
management? (I1). The partners argue
for intervention (P4) but hide their reasoning and present no evidence to justify
their argument. The managers draw conclusions about the partners’ motives
based on assumptions they do not reveal.
Their arguments A1 and A2 (management of the company will become distorted if partners intervene) are assertive
and discourage inquiry. Furthermore, the
managers make a generalization, A3
(project quality would suffer), an out-
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come that contradicts to the purpose of
the organizational design process (bringing order to and reducing chaos in the
management of the company) without
giving any evidence to support or explain this generalization. The logical but
misleading interpretation is that the managers regard the partners as incompetent.
This interpretation, if not investigated,
would probably divert the discussion
even further from the real problem, i.e.
both parties’ fear of losing unilateral
control of projects. Therefore, the consultant now raises two issues: I2 (are the
partners incompetent?), and I3 (do the
managers fear they will be micro-managed?). The managers respond by blaming the partners both for being wrong and
blind to the fact that they are wrong (P2).
But as is evident from Figure 2, the managers fail to support their claim. This
suggests that they are (maybe unconsciously) accusing the partners of something of which they are equally guilty.
The partners defend themselves (A4),
and then state that the managers fear losing control (P3). But, the partners admit
at this point that they too fear losing unilateral control. They are willing to be
candid because they know the discussion
is meant to reduce, not reinforce, defenses.
After the discussion, the consultant
helped the actors redesign their roles.
Then he focused the group’s effort on redesigning their discussions by using the
case writing method outlined in Section
4.3. A transcription of the redesigned
conversation appears in Appendix B. In
the following, I use the IBIS method to
analyze the conversation (Figure 3) and
briefly compare it with the earlier conversation (Figure 2). Model II action
strategies are evident: the actors now en-

gage in dialectical thinking and minimize unilateral face saving. For example, the managers present an argument
A1 (I do not wish to prevent Partner 1
from talking to others) that undermines
their position P1 (Partners should not intervene in project management) and supports the partners’ point of view. They
also make themselves vulnerable by
openly revealing their fears. For instance, the managers state they fear the
restructuring program will fail because
the partners may violate the new structure and rules (P2). But instead of blaming others (A3, A6) the managers now
recognize that their own behaviour may
actually cause the partners to violate the
rules and the structure. They also undermine their position P2 by stating that
they realize the dangers of using the
structure to protect themselves (A4) and
then explaining why they think they need
protection (A5). The partners propose
role-plays to let everyone see the benefits of discussing fears openly (P3, I5).
4.4.2. Discussion
I have illustrated the IBIS method as a
resource that could be used to make explicit actors’ defensive reasoning, and
thereby help them reflect on their conversations and actions. My illustration
implies that the IBIS-component of the
CT platform might facilitate and reinforce the ability of both individual actors
and groups to productively negotiate
control over their work, rules and resources. The proposed CT component
would enhance this learning process by
helping actors visually structure and analyze their discussions. More important,
it could be linked to other CT components such as workflow management
technologies, so that the IBIS-compo-
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nent could be invoked whenever an ambiguous situation involving multiple actors disrupts routine workflow. The resulting conversations would provide the
basis for a new division of work and for
the allocation and enactment of rules and
resources (including CT) to foster working and learning.
Yet it would be naive to think that any
kind of computerized system is a panacea that enables organizational learning.
For example, the IBIS method is not
powerful enough to elicit the values, beliefs, and experiences of actors nor the
expertise embedded in them. This flaw
lets actors simply learn the new Model II
congruent rules of the game and produce
issue-nets that illustrate productive reasoning without having to change their
governing values. The IBIS method does
not pick up on the problem. Therefore,
shared understanding and productive
reasoning remain difficult to accomplish.
In fact, Eden (1991) states that real beliefs and values of actors cannot be elicited and incorporated thoroughly into
any computerized system because actors
are often incapable of fully externalizing
their interpretation processes. Moreover,
several structural and behavioural issues
may impede learning and cannot be addressed by any technology alone.
Shared understanding, even if
achievable, will not resolve all conflicts
(Gabarro 1991). Moreover, mutual trust,
which is a precondition to productive
reasoning and negotiated control, cannot
be established solely by making a commitment to understanding the points of
view of others, as Argyris seems to suggest. Each actor also assesses the motives, discretion, and competence of other actors and many other factors in deciding whether or not to be candid (Gabarro

1991). Gabarro (1991, p. 109) identifies
yet another barrier, which he calls “managerial paradox”: “while it is crucial that
managers be able to listen nonjudgmentally (to understand other points of view
and get valid information), the essence of
management is to do just the opposite—
to make judgments. Managers … in turn,
are evaluated on how well they do this.
The danger, then, is that this bias for
judging will subvert a manager’s inclination to listen carefully and, in doing so,
sabotage his or her ability to make accurate business and people judgments.” As
long as actors seek unilateral control and
are rewarded for doing so, organizational
learning is learning by the few to reinforce control over the many.

5. Conclusions
I have employed Argyris’ (1990) organizational learning theory to uncover reasons for the mediocre exploitation of Coordination Technologies in organizations. This theory states that organizations have to adopt Model II theory-inuse to benefit fully from the ideas in the
involvement and commitment theory of
management. I have noted that the bulk
of CT literature does not fully acknowledge that deep organizational changes
requiring double-loop learning may be
needed before organizations can improve work performance and their employment of CT to enhance organizational coordination and learning.
I have identified three organizational
implications of this theory: First, Coordination Technologies will be underused as
long as the organizational theory-in-use
is Model I. Second, the designers of CT
must make a cognitive shift toward Mod-
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el II so that CT support and reinforce ongoing reflection on unquestioned routines and practices as well as negotiated
control over the rules and resources
drawn upon in these routines and practices. Otherwise, organizations are likely to
continue to reinforce the defensive fit
with technological properties such as anonymity. Third, other structural properties, such as incentive schemes to foster
the effectiveness of computer-supported
team work, should be employed to reinforce this cognitive shift. When these implications are taken into account, CT will
likely be regarded as less threatening and
more useful than otherwise would be the
case.
I have presented Issue-Based Information Systems and Case-Based Reasoning as two promising methods that
can be deployed to design CT that foster
reflection and learning. I have also used
a case example to illustrate how the IBIS
method could be employed to help actors
reflect on their defensive reasoning processes and to facilitate the redesign of
their discourse patterns to permit productive reasoning. An interesting topic
for future research is whether the envisioned CT platform can be combined
with existing workflow management
technologies to give the transformation
of chaos and ambiguity into novel and
innovative institutional arrangements
and routines equal support with routine
coordination tasks.
Researchers and practitioners can
now argue that the technologies that call
for major changes in organizational behaviour should not be introduced (or
even developed) because their chance of
success is questionable. For example,
Kanter (1983) claims that successful
technological innovations minimize the

need for organizational change. Unfortunately, the business value of such innovations is usually questionable, making
Kanter’s position untenable.
At least two challenges must be overcome before the above-mentioned implications can be considered in the design
and deployment of CT. First, a major organizational shift toward Model II is
very cost-intensive. It takes several years
of training and mentoring at the workplace because actors tend to act defensively unless they are exposed to Model
II thinking and action for a long period.
Second, not everybody is capable or
willing to reflect upon their defensive
routines. Hence, the learning process
must inevitably be reinforced by firing
actors who cannot or will not unlearn
their outdated behavioural patterns (Charan 1991, Hedberg 1981, Tunstall 1983).
The diffusion of Model II is likely to be
slow even with training and discharging.
If executives are to become and remain
motivated to meet these challenges, they
must see shift toward Model II as giving
their companies a competitive edge.
Moreover, the executives must themselves learn how to learn before they can
expect their subordinates to. If executives are unable or unwilling to make
themselves vulnerable despite their power and formal authority, the credibility of
the whole process is in doubt (Argyris
1990).
Another approach would be to enact
CT-enabled structural designs such as
network organizations to outperform
large companies with a set of small, relatively autonomous companies operating
under a common business strategy and
top management (Charan 1991). These
leaner and simpler organizations within
the network structure need less internal
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communication and coordination, thus
making the organizations less political
and easier to manage (Argyris 1990, Pfeffer 1992). Indeed, the potential business value of employing CT to plan, execute, and monitor contract-based transactions within and between network organizations is huge (Charan 1991).
However, if these structural designs are
employed to bypass ‘political problems,’
this approach is problematic for at least
two reasons (Pfeffer 1992). First, “It is
not clear that by ignoring the social realities of power and influence we can make
them go away, or that by trying to build
simpler, less interdependent social structures we succeed in building organizations that are more effective or that have
greater survival value” (Pfeffer 1992, p.
30). Second, “by trying to ignore issues
of power and influence in organizations,
we lose our chance to understand these
critical social processes and to train managers to cope with them” (Pfeffer 1992,
p. 30). This approach reinforces superficial learning because the new skills
needed to use power and negotiate control constructively cannot be learned.
Consequently, these structural designs
should be complemented with new skills
that enable actors to increase their capacity to tolerate the ambiguity and threat
inherent in social and technological
change without diminishing their ability
to reflect on the prevailing practices and
to constructively negotiate control.
Organizational learning is such a
complex social process that the role of
CT in fostering it will remain bounded
regardless of the sophistication of technology. Moreover, the reliable enactment
of interdependent work practices sets
limits on the level of autonomy, and most
organizations at least seem to be doing

fine, even if the levels of autonomy and
privacy are decided unilaterally. These
facts imply that organizations may not
need CT to facilitate double-loop learning processes. Maybe they do not. But
the question remains: do organizations
need CT to bypass defensive patterns?
Maybe. Yet, the role of CT in bypassing
these patterns has received more than
enough attention in coordination technology research.
Coordination technology researchers
must more actively create and share new
knowledge about the implications for the
design and deployment of CT of the discrepancy between CT that endorse the
values of the involvement and commitment theory and the realities of Model Idriven organizations. Researchers must
also recognize that achieving a fit between the structural properties of CT and
the structural properties of organizations
will not guarantee successful, learningenhancing use of CT if the fit is defensive. Unless these issues are adequately
addressed, the future CT may be carefully designed to support unilateral control
over all (in some way sensitive) information so that they better match the requirements of defensive organizations. In this
paper, I have made one of the first attempts to address these issues.
One fundamental and extremely
challenging question for future research
is how to operationalize the organizational implications identified in this paper and integrate them into a sound, costeffective development and implementation approach in a way that helps organizations (1) ensure that they are on their
way toward Model II before introducing
CT, (2) identify those possibly new features of CT fostering and reinforcing organizational learning, and (3) evaluate
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the success of CT using criteria that acknowledge the equal importance of effective organizational working and
learning, and thereby help sustain the
learning effort during implementation.
Conducting this research is resource-intensive because studying CT as mediators for and products of human action
and organizational learning must be done
in the field using many case studies and
real work situations. Moreover, it is challenging to do research on a politically
and emotionally sensitive topic that few
people want or are even able to discuss
constructively. Providing research-based
guidance to people who may not want it
is difficult. Nevertheless, the incentives
are high. Meeting this challenge will be
one of the most valuable contributions
that coordination technology researchers
can make, if the use of CT to foster
working and learning is to move from vision to reality in organizations with complex, unfriendly and authoritarian work
relations.

Notes
1
Holt (1985) coined the term ‘Coordination Technology’ to depict computer support for cooperative
work on heterogenous computer networks. Other
widely used and somewhat synonymous terms
include CSCW (Computer Supported Cooperative
Work) and Groupware.
2

I use the word ‘designer’ to refer primarily to technologists who work within an organization to
develop, tailor, and/or maintain self-developed or
purchased CT. When technologists are employed
by specialized vendors of CT, teh time-space disjuncture between the design and use of CT is often
large enough to significantly limit possibilities for
interaction and learning between vendor designers
and users.
3
I use the word ‘actor’ to refer to people in situations where there is no need to focus attention on
role-related issues such as whether a person uses
CT or is a manager.

4

The Coordinator (Flores et al. 1988) is one of the
most famous CTs. It meets well the formal, predefined coordination and unilateral control requirements of the relatively stable bureaucracies
(Grantham & Carasik 1988).

5
Naturally, there are many other suitable methods.
For example, cognitive maps are structured representations of an understanding that have been
argued to support organizational learning (Boland
et al. 1992, Eden 1991). Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation language is another representation
method that could be deployed for modeling discourse inherent in working and learning. Hashim
(1993) has combined IBIS and Toulmin’s argumentation language by using a dialogue logic approach
to ensure that the validation of arguments is captured. While all of these, and many others, are
interesting from the perspective of computer science, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore
them as possible ways to foster organizational
working and learning.
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“Partner 2: You managers fear losing
control of the timing of the project; profitability, and billability... . Partner 1 and I
worry ... if we defer to the management
of the project, we might lose the thing
that we hold dear (the design and implementation of a high quality building in a
profitable manner).

Appendix A: Discourse reflecting
defensive Model I reasoning (Argyris
1990, pp. 113-116).
(Interpretation linking the statements of
the managers and the partners is provided by this author on the basis of Argyris’
extensive case analysis.)
“Manager 1: I’m afraid that if Partners 1
and 2 have the right to enter the process
(as they just described it), they will cause
the management of the firm to become
distorted.
Manager 2: Yes; their actions can result
in a short-circuit of a coherent managerial process. It throws the weight of decision-making out of kilter, I think.

Partner 1:I am open to trying. We’ll have
to have rules at the beginning. Hopefully
I’ll get some confidence that the managers aren’t trying to pull the rug out from
under me, to push me out of my field.
And they’ll get some confidence that I’m
not trying to run away with the projects
and do things behind their backs.”

Appendix B: Discourse reflecting
productive Model II reasoning
(Argyris 1990, pp. 113-116).

It makes the management of a project
very difficult, if not impossible. It usually ends up a poorer project.”

The managers’ arguments can be interpreted in two ways: either the partners
are incompetent, or the managers fear
they will be micro-managed by the partners. When the consultant intervened in
the discussion and presented these interpretations, the managers responded by
arguing that the partners were wrong but
refused to admit it. The partners dismissed the managers’ argument by stating that they were neither that wrong nor
that inflexible. Encouraged by the consultant, the partners then revealed reasons behind their suggestion, reasons
they had initially covered up because
they assumed that revealing them would
alienate the managers.

“Manager 1: On the one hand, Partner 1,
I do not wish to prevent you from talking
to others; on the other hand, I should like
to illustrate with some examples some of
the fears that I have and get your and
others’ reactions.
Manager 1: The doubt that I have is
related to your commitment to a managerial process. Because you are beginning,
it is likely that you may violate the structure and the rules in ways that are counterproductive to the program. These fears
I have may be unfair in your mind. I’m
open to discussing them.
I don’t know how to confront Partner 2
or you in ways that we can learn from the
violations. At best, I think I feel free to
tell you—but as you can see from this
conversation—my automatic reaction is
to tell you how wrong you are and how
we must constrain you.
Manager 1: I realize the dangers of using
a structure and rules to protect us (the
managers), but I do not know how to
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carry out my job without the security of
the structure. I am willing to try to design
modes with which all of us can agree.
Partner 1: Let’s take some examples of
your worst fears and role-play them to
see what I would say and how you would
react. Let us see if with the consultant’s
help and our own, we can develop a
greater sense of trust in our competence
to integrate.
Partner 1: If I hear you correctly, you are
concerned about how genuinely open I
will be about my ability to reduce my
fears of the rug’s being pulled out from
under me, etc. Why not pick some examples and let’s try them out. I may find
that I am not as open as I espouse; or that
I vacillate, etc. You may find similar
problems.”
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